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There  are  many  examples  of  markets  where  resources  that  were  allocated  ex  ante  must  be 
rationed  ex  post.  Two  alternative  methods  of  rationing  are  considered  in  this  paper:  Priority 
Service  [see  Chao  and  Wilson  (American  Economic  Review  77,  1987)  and  Wilson  (Econometrica 
57,  1989)]  and  Proportional  Rationing  [see  Spulber  (International  Economic  Review  33,  1992)]. 
An  experimental  environment  is  developed  in  which  the  two  rules  are  implemented  within  two 
well  known  institutions,  the  English  and  the  Uniform  Price  Sealed  Bid  Auctions,  under  two 
different  information  conditions.  We  find  that  Priority  Service  generates  more  efficient  allo- 
cations  than  Proportional  Rationing,  and  the  Sealed  Bid  Auction  performs  better  than  the 
English.  Both  mechanisms  and  rationing  rules  are  more  efficient  when  there  is  a  lack  of  common 
information. 
1.  Introduction 
There  are  many  environments  in  which  the  realized  delivery  of  resources 
may  fall  short  of  planned  levels.  In  addition,  supply  cannot  always  be  readily 
adjusted  to  compensate  for  these  shortages  or  respond  to  excess  demand  in 
the  shortrun.  Therefore,  resources  that  were  planned  for  use  ex  ante,  will 
need  to  be  rationed  ex  post.  This  exploratory  study  considers  two  alternative 
institutions,  the  English  and  the  uniform  price  sealed  bid  auctions  within 
which  to  implement  two  ex  post  rationing  rules:  priority  service  and 
proportional  rationing.  Our  results  show  that  under  either  type  of  auction, 
priority  service  generates  more  efficient  allocations  than  proportional  rationing. 
Examples  of  environments  under  which  ex  post  rationing  could  be  useful 
are  abundant.  A  widely  cited  example  of  such  an  environment  is  the  market 
for  electric  power.  Generally,  there  is  a  single  supplier  (usually  a  regulated 
utility)  with  a  fixed  maximal  capacity  that  can  be  supplied  over  a  planning 
horizon.  This  capacity  and  its  related  flow  are  subject  to  unintended 
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interruptions,  e.g.,  equipment  failures.  In  addition,  there  is  a  peak-load 
problem;  a  surge  in  demand  at  certain  times  of  the  day  or  year  in  excess  of 
the  utility’s  capacity.  Another  example  which  has  motivated  our  investigation 
is  the  allocation  problem  associated  with  NASA’s  planned  space  station.  The 
station  is  to  be  a  complex  of  potentially  valuable  resources  (e.g.,  electric 
power,  pressurized  volume,  crew)  demanded  by  scientific  payloads.  The 
station  will  be  subject  to  technical  failures  leading  to  unplanned 
interruptions. 
At  first  glance,  this  would  seem  to  be  no  more  than  a  typical  allocation 
problem.  One  could  just  wait  for  the  actual  supply  and  demand  conditions 
to  be  revealed  and  then  run  a  spot  market  to  price  and  allocate  use.  [Vickrey 
(1971)  and  Bohn  et  al.  (1984)  have  advocated  the  use  of  spot  markets  in  the 
allocation  of  electric  power  resources  by  opening  up  the  power  grid  to 
competition].  Under  this  type  of  market  organization,  however,  demanders 
desiring  to  plan  in  advance  must  correctly  anticipate  spot  prices  and 
supplies.  Alternatively,  the  use  of  complete  contingent  contracts  can  assist  in 
providing  information  (forward  markets)  during  production  planning. 
However,  the  verification  cost  and  the  number  of  such  contracts  can  be 
prohibitive.  An  alternative  contingent  contracting  system  which  requires 
fewer  contracts  is  priority  service. 
This  form  of  rationing  uses  contracts  that  specify  the  order  in  which 
demanders  will  be  supplied  in  the  case  of  a  curtailment.  Harris  and  Raviv 
(1981)  were  the  first  to  investigate  this  form  of  pricing  for  the  case  of 
uncertain  demand.  They  found  that  a  monopolist  could  segment  the  market 
using  priority  prices  and  thus  enhance  revenues.  Chao  and  Wilson  (1987) 
discuss  the  use  of  priority  classes  in  which  individuals  are  rationed  by  the 
priority  class  they  select  (priority  classes  are  gradations  of  service  reliability). 
They  show  that,  when  users  have  demands  for  only  one  unit  of  service  and 
demand  and/or  supply  is  uncertain,  most  of  the  efftciency  gains  can  be 
obtained  from  a  small  number  of  priority  classes.  The  reason  why  this 
pricing  scheme  increases  efficiency  is  clear:  Those  demanders  with  higher 
values  will  be  willing  to  pay  more  for  reliability  and  thus  self-select  by 
priority  class.  Since  users  only  demand  one  unit,  rationing  by  user  is 
equivalent  to  allowing  users  to  pick  units  designated  by  priority  class. 
However,  if  demands  are  not  ‘all  or  nothing’,  then  rationing  by  user  may 
eliminate  high-valued  marginal  demand  units  and  thus  reduce  efficiency. 
One  way  to  eliminate  the  inefficiency  of  deleting  entire  demands  is  to 
specify  the  priority  contract  on  units  instead  of  individual  demands  so  that  a 
demander  can  design  a  portfolio  of  prioritized  units.  Alternatively,  one  could 
develop  rules  that  will  not  eliminate  entire  demands  when  curtailments  occur. 
Recently,  Spulber  (1989)  has  investigated  the  use  of  proportional  rationing 
schemes  in  which  individual  demands  are  scaled  up  or  down  based  on  an 
initial  allocation  of  units  and  the  available  supply.  For  example,  suppose  a C.  Noussair  and  D.  Porter,  Allocating  priority  with auctions  171 
maximum  capacity  level  of  10  units  is  allocated  among  users  so  that  if  there 
are  no  curtailments  in  the  system  users  will  obtain  this  allocation.  This  initial 
allocation  defines  a  demander’s  maximum  draw  on  the  system.  When 
capacity  falls  below  the  maximum  level,  say  to  5  units,  demanders  have  their 
initial  allocations  scaled  back  in  proportion  to  the  shortfall,  in  this  case  a 
50%  reduction  of  each  demander’s  initial  allocation.  SpuIber  suggests  that 
this  rule  is  very  easy  to  implement,  i.e.,  it  is  inexpensive  to  inform  demanders 
of  their  curtailment  and  responsibilities.  This  does  not  suggest  that  priority 
service  involves  high  transaction  costs.  In  fact,  our  experience  from  the 
experiments  described  below  is  that  both  rationing  rules  are  easy  to  operate. 
Given  the  rationing  rules  described  above,  it  is  natural  to  ask  how  such 
contracts  should  be  allocated  or  priced.  If  the  planner  knows  the  distribution 
of  potential  demands  and  system  reliability,  prices  for  these  contracts  can  be 
calculated  to  maximize  expected  system  surplus  given  the  contract  structure. 
Alternatively,  one  could  design  a  process  to  endogenously  determine  prices 
for  these  contracts  that  requires  no  knowledge  of  user  demands  and  can 
adjust  to  actual  demand  conditions  as  opposed  to  expected  demand.  Harris 
and  Raviv  attempt  to  design  such  a  mechanism  to  endogenously  determine 
priority  prices  for  the  case  of  single  unit  demands.  They  use  a  modified 
version  of  the  Vickrey  (1961)  sealed  bid  auction  in  which  the  winning  bid 
does  not  pay  his  bid,  but  instead  pays  the  first  rejected  bid.  The  Harris  and 
Raviv  modi~cation  allows  the  seller  to  specify  a  reservation  sale  price  so  that 
more  revenue  can  be  extracted.  In  this  paper,  we  propose  an  English  and  a 
uniform  price  sealed  bid  auction  that  will  endogenously  allocate  and  price 
priority  service  and  propotional  rationing  contracts  in  an  experimental 
setting.  We  selected  these  auctions  because  they  are  efficient  (both  theoreti- 
cally  and  experimentally)  in  environments  where  buyers  have  single  unit 
demands  and  supply  is  certain. 
Using  auctions  as  a  method  to  organize  the  market  we  address  several 
issues:  What  are  the  differences  in  the  efficiencies  and  revenues  of  the 
alfocations  under  priority  service  and  proportional  rationing?  How  sensitive 
is  each  rationing  rule  and  each  auction  to  changes  in  the  information  which 
demanders  have‘?  Is  one  auction  able  to  obtain  a  more  efficient  allocation 
and  generate  more  revenue  than  the  other?  Finally,  can  we  find  the  ‘best’ 
way,  from  the  standpoint  of  efficiency,  to  organize  the  market  in  these 
environments‘? 
The  paper  proceeds  as  follows.  Section  2  details  our  experimental  design, 
procedures,  and  auction  institutions.  The  results  of  our  experiments  are  listed 
and  explained  in  section  3. In  section  4  we  offer  our  conclusions. 
2.  Experimental design 
The  experimental  design/environment  described  below  compares  two  infor- 172  C.  Noussair  and  D.  Porter,  Allocating  priority  with auctions 
Table  1 
Experimental  conditions 
Common  information 
Priority  Prop. 
service  rationing 
No  common  information 
Priority  Prop. 
service  rationing 
Uniform  price  auction 
English  auction 
S/PS/CO  S/PR/CO  SIPSI  SIPRI 
NOCO  NOCO 
EjPSjCO  E/PR/CO  EIPSI  WPRI 
NOCO  NOCO 
mation  treatments  (common  information  about  the  underlying  distributions 
and  no  common  information),  two  pricing  mechanisms  (English  and  uniform 
price  sealed  bid  auctions),  and  two  rationing  rules  (priority  service  and 
proportional  rationing)  -  see  table  1.  To  date,  very  little  research  (both 
theory  and  experiments)  has  been  conducted  with  one-sided  multi-unit 
auctions  when  demands  are  multi-unit.  Also,  the  only  direct  experimental 
research  with  ex  post  rationing  rules  can  be  found  in  Banks  et  al.  (1989)  and 
Elliot  et  al.  (1990).  Banks  et  al.  focus  their  attention  on  a  combinatorial 
fitting  problem  in  addition  to  having  a  stochastic  supply.  Elliot  et  al. 
investigate  priority  service  and  proportional  rationing  with  an  exogenous 
pricing  and  allocation  system  where  priority  is  based  on  individual  ranks. 
They  find  that  priority  service  generates  more  efficient  allocations  than 
proportional  rationing.  Our  design  differs  from  theirs  in  the  use  of  multi-unit 
auctions  to  determine  prices  and  allocations  and  in  allowing  demanders  to 
form  their  own  portfolio  of  prioritized  units. 
Our  experimental  environment,  i.e.,  the  supply  and  demand  conditions,  is 
induced  using  monetary  incentives  [those  unfamiliar  with  experimental 
methods  in  economics  should  consult  Smith  (1982)  or  Plott  (1989)].  Each 
subject  is  given  a  payoff  function  listing  units  and  the  monetary  value  for 
which  they  could  redeem  the  units  to  the  experimenter.  In  order  to  obtain 
units  for  redemption,  subjects  use  ‘loaned’  money  to  purchase  contracts  that 
allow  them  to  secure  the  units.  The  difference  between  redemption  values 
and  prices  paid  is  profit,  which  is  distributed  to  subjects  as  their  payment  at 
the  end  of  the  experiments. 
2.1.  The  environment 
2.1.1.  Demand  types 
(1)  Demands  were  induced  via  quadratic  monetary  incentives  parameter- 
ized  by  Bi. 
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Table  2 
Individual  demand  curves  by  demand  type  (in 
Francs).” 
Marginal  value 
Unit  High  type  Medium  type  Low  type 
1  900  850  800 
2  700  550  400 
3  500  250  0 
4  300  0  0 
5  100  0  0 
6  0  0  0 
“Each  Franc  is  worth  0.4  cents. 
where  q  is  the  number  of  units  received. 
We  used  three  types  of  demanders  (high,  medium,  and  low)  that  are  listed 
in  table  2.  For  the  high  type  demanders  Bi =200  and  the  value  of  receiving 
two  units  in  the  market  is  1,600=  900+  700. 
(2)  Demands  for  portions  of  units  were  possible  so  that  demands  were 
‘continuous’.  Fractional  units  were  given  utility  based  on  the  monetary  value 
associated  with  the  next  unit.  For  example,  if  a  medium  type  demander 
received  2.5  units,  his/her  monetary  payoff  would  be  850+  550+ 
(l/2)(250)=  1,525,  minus  the  price  paid  to  obtain  a  contract  for  those  units. 
We  used  continuous  demand  functions  to  provide  the  proportional  rationing 
scheme  its  best  chance  at  obtaining  an  efficient  allocation. 
(3)  Each  experimental  session  consisted  of  six  subjects  who  participated  in  a 
series  of  ‘market  periods’  in  which  allocations  were  made.  At  the  beginning 
of  every  market  period  in  an  experimental  session,  each  participant  was 
assigned  one  of  the  three  equally  likely  demand  types.  Thus,  the  demand 
condition  was  not  stationary  each  period;  it  was  based  on  the  demand  draw. 
For  an  example,  see  fig.  1  in  which  we  illustrate  the  market  demand  for 
period  8. Appendix  A  lists  the  demand  draws  for  the  first  20  market  periods. 
(4)  Finally,  under  the  common  information  treatment,  all  participants  were 
given  the  information  in  table  2  and  told  that  each  period  each  subject 
would  be  assigned  one  of  the  equally  likely  demand  types.  In  the  treatment 
without  common  information,  participants  were  given  only  their  individual 
demands  and  not  the  distribution  of  possible  demand  types. 
2.1.2.  Supply 
The  capacity  available  to  demanders  each  period  was  uncertain,  taking  on 
one  of  three  equally  likely  states  -  5  units,  10  units,  or  15  units.  Furthermore, 
there  was  a  constant  per  unit  cost  (to  the  supplier)  which  served  as  a 
reservation  price.  The  cost  was  drawn  at  the  same  time  as  the  capacity  and 
took  on  three  possible  states;  0,  200  and  400  francs,  each  of  which  was 114  C.  Noussair  and  D.  Porter,  Allocating  priority  with  auctions 
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Fig.  1.  Period  8  of  market  demand. 
Table  3 
SUPPlY states  probability  matrix 
(under  common  information).” 
Cost  per  unit 
Capacity  units  0  200  400 
5  119  119  119 
10  119  119  119 
15  l/9  119  119 
equally  likely.  Thus,  there  were  nine  possible  supply  conditions.  In  the 
common  information  treatment  all  subjects  knew  these  conditions,  but 
without  common  information  they  were  only  given  the  ranges  of  output  and 
cost  -  [IO,  151  and  [0,400].  Table  3  lists  the  supply  states  and  associated 
probabilities  in  our  experiments  with  common  information. 
“The  expected  value  under  these 
conditions  is  an  output  of  10  units  at 
a  cost  of  200. 
The  supply  condition  (quantity  available  and  the  cost  draw)  for  each 
period  and  the  distribution  of  supply  with  no  common  information  can  be 
found  in  appendix  A.  Figure  2  shows  the  actual  supply  state  for  period  8  of 
our  experiment. 
2.1.3.  Optimality  and  competitive  equilibrium 
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Fig.  2.  Period  8  of  supply  state 
and  cost.  Denote  this  ex  post  surplus  by  17*i. Taking  the  expectation  of  these 
surpluses  over  each  state,  ~TP~I~*~,  where  pi  is  the  probability  of  state  i’s 
occurance  and  there  are  9  states,  we  can  find  the  maximal  ex  ante  surplus  for 
the  system.  This  measure  indicates  how  well  each  pricing/rationing  system 
performs  relative  to  the  competitive  equilibrium  for  complete  contingent 
claims  markets.  This  will  be  our  primary  measure  of  the  performance  of  the 
mechanisms.  The  competitive  equilibrium  prices  for  a  complete  contingent 
contract  in  this  environment  can  be  easily  calculated  from  the  parameters 
(see  appendix  B).  Fig.  3  shows  the  competitive  price  during  each  period  for 
the  three  possible  supply  outcomes  (5,lO  and  15  units),  i.e.  for  priority  one, 
two,  and  three,  respectively,  with  a  zero  cost  draw. 
2.2.  Allocation  mechanisms 
As  was  mentioned  in  the  introduction,  much  of  the  theoretical  work  on 
priority  pricing  is  devoid  of  a  description  of  endogenous  price  determination. 
For  this  study  we  shall  focus  on  two  well-established  auctions  that  produce 
efficient  outcomes  when  demands  are  single  unit.  The  first  auction  we  shall 
consider  is  the  uniform  price  sealed  bid  auction  in  which  the  (n+  1)  st  bid 
determines  the  market  price  for  the  sale  of  n  units.  When  individuals  have 
multi-unit  demands,  this  auction  may  not  produce  efficient  allocations  since 
individuals  have  an  incentive  to  underreveal  their  demand  (it  is,  however, 
dominant  to  reveal  on  your  highest  valued  unit).  The  second  auction 176  C.  Noussair  and  D.  Porter,  Allocating  priority  with  auctions 
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Fig.  3.  Competitive  equilibrium  prices  (0  cost  draw). 
considered  is  the  ascending  bid  English  auction  in  which  bids  for  individual 
units  are  submitted  and  the  process  stops  when  no  demander  wishes  to 
submit  a  new  bid  above  the  standing  bids.  When  demands  are  single  unit 
and  when  values  are  independent  and  private,  this  auction  is  efficient  and 
isomorphic  to  the  uniform  price  auction.  When  demands  are  multi-unit,  this 
effkiency  and  isomorphism  no  longer  holds. 
While  it  is  true  that  the  mechanisms  we  have  selected  do  not  necessarily 
provide  incentives  to  implement  the  efficient  outcome,  they  do  possess  the 
following  characteristics: 
(i)  the  mechanisms  are  deficit-free  (the  budget  is  balanced  and  no  transfers 
are  necessary); 
(ii)  all  demanders  that  are  allocated  units  will  (theoretically)  pay  the  same 
price  for  the  item  (no  discrimination  is  necessary); 
(iii)  as  the  number  of  bidders  increases  the  theoretical  outcome  converges  to 
the  competitive  outcome. 
The  experimental  evidence  to  date  on  these  auctions  is  quite  diverse.  When 
demands  have  single  values  drawn  independently  from  a  fixed  and  common 
distribution,  a  single  unit  is  to  be  auctioned  and  the  demanders  know  the 
distribution  from  which  values  are  drawn,  both  the  English  and  uniform 
price  auctions  produce  the  competitive  outcomes  [see  Cox  et  al.  (1982)]. 
When  demands  have  single  values  drawn  independently  from  a  fixed  and 
common  distribution  and  multiple  units  are  to  be  auctioned,  the  English  and C.  Noussair  and  D. Porter,  Allocating  priority  with auctions  177 
uniform  price  auctions  produce  different  outcomes  [see  McCabe  et  al. 
(1990)].  The  English  auction  is  slightly  more  efficient  and  it  generates  more 
stable  prices. 
There  has  been  very  little  work  investigating  environments  when  demands 
are  multiple  unit  and  several  units  are  to  be  auctioned.  Burns  (1985) 
investigated  sequential  English  auctions  and  found  that  they  converge  to  the 
competitive  equilibrium  after  a  few  periods.  Miller  and  Plott  (1985)  investi- 
gated  the  uniform  price  sealed  bid  auction.  Bidding  behavior  converged  to 
the  competitive  equilibrium  with  demand  revealing  behavior.  In  both  of  these 
studies  there  was  no  common  information  about  demand  types  and  indivi- 
duals’  demands  were  fixed  for  several  periods.  The  Miller  and  Plott  study 
was  designed  to  test  the  revenue  generating  properties  of  the  uniform  price 
auction  against  the  discriminative  auction.  They  placed  several  units  at  the 
competitive  equilibrium  while  individual  demands  were  for  only  two  units, 
thus  preventing  the  strategic  underrevelation  of  demand. 
The  only  other  studies  that  use  these  institutions  in  more  complicated 
environments  are  Banks  et  al.  (1989)  and  Grether  et  al.  (1981).  Banks  et  al.3 
results  indicate  that  a  uniform  price  sealed  bid  mechanism  does  not  seem  to 
coordinate  demands  as  well  as  an  English  auction.  The  sealed  bid  auction  in 
Grether  et  al.  requires  the  use  of  an  after-market  to  achieve  efficient 
allocations. 
Thus,  the  existing  experimental  evidence  suggests  that  the  English  auction 
(if  designed  properly)  is  more  efficient  than  the  uniform  price  auction.  Here, 
we  extend  both  of  these  auctions  to  allocate  priority.  The  next  subsection 
describes  in  detail  the  mechanisms  used  in  our  experiment. 
2.2.1.  English  auction  with  priority  service 
Recall  that  there  is  a  maximum  of  15  units  available  regardless  of 
mechanisms  or  rationing  rule  employed.  In  the  English  auction  with  priority 
service  each  of  the  fifteen  units  was  assigned  to  a  slot  and  each  slot  was  bid 
on  separately.  Each  slot  had  a  corresponding  level  of  reliability  or  ‘priority 
class’.  The  fifteen  slots  were  grouped  into  three  priority  classes  with  five  units 
available  in  each  class.  The  auction  for  all  units  was  simultaneous  so  that 
subjects  could  see  the  price  formation  across  the  priority  contracts.  The 
rationing  rule  stipulated  that  class  one  units  would  be  supplied  before  class 
two  units,  and  so  forth.  The  auction  closed  randomly  but  within  a  pre- 
specified  time  interval.  However,  if  no  new  bid  was  received  on  a  unit  in  any 
class  for  20  seconds,  the  market  closed  even  if  the  time  interval  had  not  yet 
elapsed.  When  there  was  no  common  information,  we  added  the  condition 
that  rationing  within  a  priority  class  would  be  performed  on  the  basis  of  the 
accepted  bids,  i.e.,  low  bids  were  the  first  to  be  curtailed.  Demanders  paid  the 
amount  of  their  bid  and  only  paid  for  units  they  received.  If  a  demander’s 
bid  did  not  cover  the  reservation  price  he/she  was  not  awarded  the  unit. 178  C.  Noussuir  and  D. Porter,  Allocafing  priority  with  auctions 
The  Walrasian  equilibrium  (in  which  all  demanders  behave  as  price  takers) 
for  these  contracts  results  in  near  100(x  efficiency  for  our  parameters  (two 
periods  are  at  98%  efficiency).  Appendix  B  provides  the  method  for 
calculating  the  Walrasian  equilibrium  prices  and  allocations  for  these 
contracts. 
2.2.2.  English  uuction  with  proportional  rutioning 
In  the  English  auction  with  proportional  rationing  a  uniform  price  English 
‘clock’  determined  price  and  allocations.  The  auction  opened  with  a  low 
posted  price  at  which  buyers  submitted  the  amount  they  demanded.  If 
demand  was  greater  than  the  maximal  capacity  of  15  units  at  that  price,  the 
price  was  increased.  To  ‘guarantee’  convergence,  demanders  could  only  ‘stand 
pat’  or  reduce  their  demand  at  each  new  price.  If  there  was  no  ‘clearing’ 
price,  units  were  dispensed  at  the  lowest  price  at  which  demand  did  not 
exceed  the  maximal  capacity  (15  units).  Units  were  then  curtailed  pro- 
portionally.  That  is,  final  allocations  were  determined  by  multiplying  the  ex 
ante  allocations  by  [actual  capacity/l5].  Demanders  paid  only  for  units  and 
fractions  of  units  they  received. 
We  utilize  the  English  clock  because  all  15  units  are  treated  as  identical 
and  thus  only  one  price  is  needed.  There  is  no  need  to  rank  units  by  bids  or 
class  since  rationing  is  based  on  subscription.  As  we  did  for  the  other 
contracts,  we  calculate  the  prices  and  the  allocations  under  the  Walrasian 
equilibrium.  This  institution  is  not  ex  ante  fully  efficient  because  demanders 
cannot  choose  an  optimal  quantity  for  each  realization  of  supply.  However, 
for  our  parameters,  efficiency  at  the  Walrasian  equilibrium  for  these  con- 
tracts  is  above  97’:;  every  period. 
2.2.3.  Unijtirm  price  sealed  bid  with  priority  sertlice 
The  sealed-bid  mechanism  used  in  the  experiments  was  a  second  price 
auction  in  which  the  price  per  unit  was  determined  by  the  first-rejected  bid. 
Subjects  could  submit  up  to  ten  bids  in  a  period  of  the  form  <  P,  Q >,  where 
P  was  a  per-unit  bid  and  Q  was  the  number  of  units,  in  tenths,  requested  at 
that  price.  All  of  the  submitted  bids  were  arrayed  from  highest  to  lowest. 
When  the  supply  draw  was  made  the  quantity  supplied  was  the  quantity  at 
which  the  bid  array  ‘crossed’  the  supply  array  with  price  being  the  higher  of 
the  first-rejected  bid  or  the  cost  draw.  All  of  the  bids  greater  than  the  price 
were  accepted.  Demanders  received  an  amount  of  units  equal  to  the  sum  of 
the  quantities  specified  in  their  accepted  bids.  With  our  parameters,  the 
highest  five  bids  were  always  accepted,  the  next  five  highest  are  accepted 
two-thirds  of  the  time,  etc.  Therefore,  the  top  five  bids  had  highest  priority. 
An  example  is  provided  in  fig.  4  which  is  an  illustration  of  the  market 
condition  in  period  8. 
Notice  that  if  demanders  behave  like  price-takers,  a  fully  efficient  allo- C.  Noussair  and  D. Porter,  Allocating  priority  with  auctions  179 
ouontity 
Fig.  4.  Price  determination  for  uniform  price  auction. 
cation  is  achieved  because  the  price  is  conditional  on  the  realization  of 
supply.  That  is,  it  is  equivalent  to  a  full  menu  of  contingent  claims  contracts. 
Thus  we  avoid  the  problem,  which  occurs  with  proportional  rationing,  of  the 
demanders  being  able  to  choose  only  one  quantity  to  maximize  profits  across 
realizations  of  supply. 
2.2.4.  Uniform  price  sealed  bid  with  proportional  rationing 
The  proportional  rationing  formulation  of  the  sealed  bid  mechanism 
allowed  demanders  to  submit  up  to  10  bids  of  the  form  <P,  Q >.  The  bids 
were  arrayed  as  in  the  priority  service  formulation  and  the  price  and 
allocation  were  determined  as  follows.  The  fifteen  units  were  initially 
allocated  to  the  demanders  who  submitted  the  highest  bids.  They  paid  a  per 
unit  price  equal  to  the  higher  of  the  highest  rejected  bid  and  the  cost  draw. 
When  the  actual  supply  was  less  than  15  units,  the  allocations  were  scaled 
back  by  the  fraction  of  the  maximal  capacity  that  was  supplied.  Demanders 
only  paid  for  units  which  they  actually  received. 
All  of  the  auctions  described  above  were  conducted  with  and  without 
common  information  about  the  underlying  distributions.  The  instructions 
used  for  these  experiments  were  computerized.  These  instructions  are  avail- 
able  from  the  authors  upon  request. 
2.3.  Procedures 
There  were  six  subjects  in  each  experiment.  Although  some  subjects  had 180 
Experiment 
IlO. 
1  E/B/CO  8  Caltech  115 
2  SjPS/CO  10  Caltech  90 
3  E/PS/NOCO  8  Occidental  110 
4  S/PS/NOCO  10  Caltech  95 
5  S/PR/CO  10  Caltech  83 
6  E/PR/CO  IO  Caltech  95 
I  EjPSjCO  10  Caltech  120 
8  E/PS/NOCO  IO  Caltech  105 
Y  E/PS/CO  7  PCC  110 
10  E/PR/CO  8  PCC  105 
11  E/PR/NOCO  IO  Caltech  90 
12  E/PR/NOCO  10  Caltech  100 
13  S/PS/CO  IO  PCC  95 
14  S/PS,‘NOCO  10  PCC  90 
15  S/PS/CO  10  Caltech  x5 
16  S/PR/CO  IO  PCC  100 
17  S/PR/NOCO  IO  PCC  95 
18  S/PR,‘NOCO  IO  PCC  95 
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Table  4 
Summary  of  experiments  conducted.” 
Mechanism/rule/ 
information  Periods  Subject  pool 
Experiment 






















“E =  English,  S = sealed,  PS = priority  service,  PR  = proportional  rationing,  CO  = common 
information,  PCC  =  Pasadena  City  College 
been  in  other  experiments  in  the  past,  they  had  no  prior  experience  with  this 
line  of  experimentation.  An  experiment  consisted  of  at  least  seven  periods  in 
one  of  four  mechanism/rationing-rule  conditions.  Subjects  read  a  set  of 
computerized  instructions  and  then  participated  in  a  practice  round  of 
bidding  to  familiarize  themselves  with  the  institution  and  accounting  pro- 
cedures.  Table  4  lists  the  experiments  we  conducted. 
3.  Results 
This  section  presents  the  results  of  the  experiments  listed  in  table  4.  We 
first  investigate  the  overall  performance  of  each  institution  in  terms  of 
efficiency  and  contract  prices  and  then  investigate  the  individual  behavior  of 
participants  in  each  market. 
3.1.  Overull  performance 
3.1.1.  Efficiency 
Table  5 provides  the  mean  efficiency  achieved  as  a  percent  of  the  optimum 
(competitive  equilibrium)  for  each  institution.’  Within  each  cell  are  the 
‘The  theoretical  expected  efficiencies  resulting  from  posting  the  priority  prices  calculated  by 
the  method  found  in  Wilson  (1989)  and  the  proportional  rationing  prices  calculated  by  the 
method  found  in  Spulber  (1989)  for  our  parameters  average  92.07:  and  94X%,  respectively. C.  Noussair  and D.  Porter,  Allocating  priority  with auctions  181 
Table  5 
Efficiency  (percentage  of  optimum)  of  each  institution. 
Priority  service  Proportional  rationing 
Periods  l-5  Periods  5 +  Periods  1-5  Periods  5+ 
Mean  Range  Mean  Range  Mean  Range  Mean  Range 
E/Co  90  (70,  99)  92  (81,  99)  86  (71,  99)  84  (70,  99) 
E/NoCo  92  (84,  99)  93  (86,  99)  91  (74,  99)  91  (74,  99) 
SB/Co  92  (79,  98)  96  (93,  98)  87  (74,  99)  89  (74,  97) 
SB/NoCo  96  (90,  100)  98  (94,  loo)  90  (80,  97)  90  (80,  97) 
efficiency  for  all  periods  (left  two  numbers  in  the  cell)  and  the  efficiency  for 
periods  5 and  above  (right  two  numbers  in  the  cell). 
We  can  state  the  following  results: 
Result  I.  Priority  service  generates  higher  efficiencies  than  proportional 
rationing  within  both  mechanisms  but  is  significant  only  within  the  uniform 
price  sealed  bid  mechanism. 
Support.  A  rank  sum  test  of  the  efficiencies  yields  a  z-score  of  1.79  and  3.77 
for  the  common  and  no  common  information  cases,  respectively,  in  the 
sealed-bid  mechanism.  The  z-scores  for  the  English  auction  are  0.84  and  0.23. 
Result  2.  The  uniform  price  sealed  bid  auction  (with  priority  service) 
outperforms  the  English  auction. 
Support.  The  rank  sum  test  of  efticiencies  yields  z-scores  of  1.23  and  2.70  for 
the  common  and  no  common  information  cases,  respectively. 
Result  1 suggests  that  unless  one  has  some  specific  information  about  the 
underlying  supply  and  demand  conditions,  one  should  use  priority  service 
over  proportional  rationing.  For  example,  if  demand  curves  are  continuous 
and  individuals’  quantities  demanded  are  proportional  across  supply  states,’ 
then  proportional  rationing  is  likely  to  lead  to  high  efticencies.  Result  2 
states  that  in  contrast  to  previous  experimental  findings,  the  uniform  price 
sealed  bid  auction  (with  priority  service)  seems  to  generate  more  efficient 
allocations  than  the  English  auction.  The  English  auction  did,  however, 
prove  slightly  better  in  the  case  of  proportional  rationing  in  the  absence  of 
common  information.  These  results  suggest  that  either: 
(a)  The  way  in  which  the  English  auction  was  implemented  could  be 
improved  upon,  or 
‘For  example,  suppose  there  are  two  supply  states.  In  state  one  n  units  are  supplied,  while  in 
state  two  2n  units  are  supplied.  For  each  buyer,  quantity  demanded  at  the  optimum  is  4  in  state 
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Fig.  5.  Average  efficiency  by  output  realization  (common  knowledge  periods  5 +) 
(b)  Strategic  behavior  by  participants  in  the  English  auction  may  have  a 
detrimental  effect  on  its  performance. 
We  will  discuss  each  of  these  in  detail  later.  However,  let  us  first  consider 
the  ability  of  the  mechanisms  to  allocate  each  contingent  claim.  In  general, 
each  mechanism  performs  worst  when  the  reservation  price  is  400  and  10  or 
15  units  are  available,  indicating  that  the  cost  covering  uncertainty  condition 
is  not  handled  well  by  any  of  the  mechanisms.  If  we  focus  only  on  the  0 
reservation  price  states,  we  find  some  of  the  sources  of  inefficiency  in  the 
mechanisms  (see  figs.  5  and  6).  Proportional  rationing  works  best  when  units 
must  be  rationed,  while  priority  service  works  best  when  the  system  is  in  its 
worst  and  best  states.  The  major  source  of  inefficiency  in  the  English  auction 
with  priority  service  comes  in  the  intermediate  supply  condition.  As  we  shall 
see  in  the  next  subsection,  this  result  is  caused  by  ‘strategic’  behavior  of  the 
participants.  The  next  result  compares  the  no  common  information  with  the 
common  information  condition. 
Result  3.  Each  mechanism  performs  better  when  there  is  no  common 
information  providing  a  basis  for  common  priors.  The  gains  are  most 
significant  in  sealed  bid/PS. 
Support.  The  rank  sum  tests  yields  z-scores  of  1.12  (sealed  bid/PR),  1.16 
(English  auction/PS),  1.33  (English/PR),  and  3.19  (sealed  bid/PS). 
It  seems  that  under  common  information,  demanders  are  more  likely  to C.  Noussair  and  D. Porter,  Allocating  priority  with  auctions  183 
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Fig.  6.  Average  efficiency  by  output  realization  (no  common  knowledge  periods  5 +) 
Table  6 
Mean  competitive  revenue  by  mechanism. 
Uniform  price  auction  English  auction 
Priority  Proportional  Priority  Proportional 
service  rationing  service  rationing 
6,183”  4,441  3,813  4,441 
“This  is  also  the  CECCC  predicted  mean  revenue. 
behave  strategically.  By  underrevealing  their  demands  on  the  marginal 
unit(s),  they  can  lower  the  prices  which  they  pay  for  other  units.  In  the  no 
common  information  condition  there  is  greater  uncertainty  about  which 
units  are  marginal  and  thus  about  whether  underrevelation  can  lower  prices. 
By  discouraging  this  behavior,  the  lack  of common  information  induces  more 
efficient  outcomes. 
3.1.2.  Revenue  and prices 
Recall  that  we  can  determine  the  Walrasian  equilibrium  prices  for  each 
contract  implicit  in  each  mechanism.  That  is,  given  that  either  priority 
service  or  proportional  rationing  contracts  are  to  be  allocated,  we  can 
determine  the  competitive  equilibria  for  these  contacts.  Each  of  the  above 
mechanisms  yield  different  revenue  at  their  market  clearing  prices.  In  table  6, 184  C.  Noussair  and  D.  Porter,  Allocating  priority  with  auctions 
Table  I 
Actual  revenue  as  a  percentage  of  CECCC  (means  and  ranges). 
Uniform  common 
Uniform  no  common 
English  common 
English  no  common 
Priority  service  Proportional  rationing 
Periods  l-5  Periods  5+  Period  l-5  Periods  5t 
71  (52,  82)  70  (52,  82) -  15(47,98)  77  (48,  93) 
68  (46,  85)  67  (46,  83)  56  (28,  79)  58  (34,  79) 
68  (45,  89)  71  (48,  89)  70  (31,  120)  69  (31,  102) 
66  (34,  98)  65  (34,  94)  74  (27,  113)  71  (27,  99) 
we  show  the  predicted  mean  revenue  for  each  institution  at  their  market- 
clearing  prices  (the  calculations  for  each  institution  are  supplied  in  Appendix 
B).  The  revenue  levels  achieved  as  a  percent  of  the  competitive  equilibrium 
for  complete  contingent  contracts  (CECCC)  are  given  in  table  7.j 
We  now  state  the  following  results: 
Result  4.  Each  institution  yields  revenues  significantly  below  the  CECCC 
revenue  levels. 
Support.  The  t-statistics  of  deviations  from  the  CECCC  ranged  from  -4.99 
to  -20.34. 
For  each  mechanism  we  can  calculate  the  competitive  prices  for  the 
contracts  being  sold.  Figs.  7-9  are  the  boxplots  of  the  actual  prices  in  the 
market  as  a  percentage  of  the  Walrasian  equilibrium  prices.  The  results  are 
as  follows. 
Result  5.  Priority  1  prices  are  significantly  below  the  market  clearing  price 
in  the  uniform  price  auction.  We  cannot  reject  the  hypothesis  that  priority  2 
and  3  are  equal  to  the  market  clearing  prices.  The  variance  of  the  prices 
relative  to  the  market  clearing  case,  however,  is  high. 
Support.  The  mean  and  standard  deviation  for  the  differences  of  the 
contract  prices  and  the  Walrasian  equilibrium  are  given  in  table  8. 
Result  6.  In  the  English  auction  with  priority  service  we  find  that  priority  1 
prices  are  above  and  priority  3  prices  are  below  the  market  clearing  price. 
Therefore,  a  premium  is  being  paid  for  high  priority  and  a  discount  for  low 
priority. 
Support.  See  table  9  which  gives  the  differences  between  the  prices  observed 
in  the  experiment  and  the  Walrasian  equilibrium  prices. 
Result  7.  The  proportional  rationing  Walrasian  prices  seem  to  be  good 
3The  mean  revenues  generated  with  our  parameters  by  posting  the  priority  service  and 
proportional  rationing  prices  are  4,350  and  4,480,  respectively. C.  Noussair  and D.  Porter,  Allocating  priority  with auctions 
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Fig.  8. Observed  prices  as percentage  of WE-S/PS. 
predictors  of  the  observed  prices.  There  is,  however,  substantial  variance  in 
the  prices. 
Support.  Table  10 shows  the  differences  between  the  observed  prices  and  the 
prices  that  would  result  if  all  demanders  were  price  takers.  The  differences 
are  computed  for  both  the  English  and  the  uniform  price  auctions  under 
proportional  rationing. 186  C.  Noussair  and  D.  Porter,  Allocating  priority  with  auctions 
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Table  8 
Sealed  bid  auction  with  priority  service. 
Priority  1 
Mean  Stdev 
Priority  2 
Mean  Stdev 
Priority  3 
Mean  Stdev 
Common  -117  44  13  64  31.6  141 
No  common  -95  69  -  19  68  -9  143 
Table  9 
English  auction  with  priority  service. 
Priority  1  Priority  2  Priority  3 
Mean  Stdev  _  Mean  Stdev  Mean  Stdev 
Common  57  93  -14  121  -64  174 
No  common  14  101  29  99  -45  112 
Table  10 
Proportional  rationing  prices. 
Uniform  price  English 
Mean  Stdev  Mean  Stdev 
Common  19.8  52  16.7  101 
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Fig.  10.  95%  confidence  intervals  of  bids  by  value. 
In  general,  we have  found  that  market  clearing  prices  based  on  price  taking 
behavior  are  not  good  predictors  of  prices  generated  by  the  mechanisms.4  rt 
seems  likely  that  either  risk  aversion  and/or  strategic  behavior  are  causing 
the  deviation  in  these  prices  from  the  competitive  equilibrium.  Under  risk 
aversion,  there  would  be  a  greater  premium  paid  for  the  priority  one  units 
(which  have  a  higher  probability  of  delivery)  than  under  risk  neutrality  in 
both  the  English  and  the  uniform  price  auctions  with  priority  service. 
Strategic  behavior,  as  previously  mentioned,  manifests  itself  in  under- 
revelation  of demand  with  the  intent  of affecting  prices,  and  can  occur  in any 
of  the  eight  conditions.  In  the  next  section,  we  discuss  the  behavior  of 
individual  bidders. 
3.2.  Individual  behavior 
3.2.1.  Priority  service 
Uniform  price  auction  In  fig.  10 we  show  the  error  bars  of  bids  for  each 
value  of  the  three  demand  types  (under  common  information)  for  periods  5 
to  10.  This  figure  makes  clear  that  there  is  underrevelation  of  demand 
“The  Wilson  posted  prices  are  not  good  predictors  of  the  observed  priority  prices  either.  The 
mean  differences  in  the  English  auction  are  92  francs  for  priority  one,  143  for  priority  two,  and 
161  for  priority  three  with  the  observed  prices  always  less  than  the  posted.  The  means  of  the 
quantity  (observed  prices  -posted  prices)  for  the  sealed  bid  are  31,  20  and  -  61  francs  for 
priority  classes  one,  two  and  three,  respectively.  The  Spulber  posted  prices  are  also  poor 
predictors  of  the  observed  proportional  rationing  prices.  In  the  English  auction,  the  observed 
prices  exceed  the  posted  by  an  average  of  36  francs  and  the  variance  is  very  high.  In  the  sealed 
bid  auction  the  posted  prices  exceed  the  observed  by  an  average  of  89  francs  and  the  variance  is, 
again,  very  high. 188  C.  Noussair  and  D.  Porter,  Allocating  priority  with  auctions 
Table  11 
Distribution  of  bidding  strategies  in  SjPS  (%). 
Strategy 
Common  inf.  No  common  inf. 
Periods  l-5  Periods  6-10  Periods  l-5  Periods  6-10 
Underreveal  34  48  33  55 
Reveal  1  23  17  28 
Area  21  18  20  12 
DORQ  32  11  30  5 
occurring  in  this  mechanism.  There  is  a  large  interval  for  the  high  type 
demanders  on  their  bids  for  units  below  their  highest  value.  The  low  demand 
types  have  a  large  interval  for  bids  on  their  high  value  and  a  very  small 
interval  for  bids  on  their  low  valued  unit.  For  all  types  of  demanders,  the 
intervals  are  smaller  when  there  is  no  common  information. 
In  searching  through  the  data,  we  have  identified  four  mutually  exclusive 
and  exhaustive  bidding  strategies  used  by  subjects.  These  bidding  strategies 
are  defined  as  follows: 
(1)  Reveal.  These  bids  that  exactly  match  values; 
(2)  Underreveal.  These  are  bids  that  are  less  than  or  equal  to  each  value  and 
strictly  less  for  at  least  one  of  the  bids  submitted; 
(3)  Area.  Bids  such  that  any  ordered  subsets  of  bids  that  are  accepted  will 
not  result  in  a  loss.  However,  there  is  overrevelation  on  at  least  one  unit; 
(4)  DORQ.  (dominated  overrevelation  of  quantity)  There  is  an  overrevelation 
which  may  cause  the  demander  to  lose  money. 
Notice  that  area  and  DORQ  bidding  are  dominated  strategies.  Area  and 
DORQ  bidders  are  trying  to  aggregate  parts  of  their  demands  (flattening 
their  demands)  in  an  attempt  to  get  units  into  a  higher  priority  class  then 
they  would  if  they  bid  their  valuations.  Table  11  illustrates  the  frequency  of 
these  strategies  by  period.  The  results  are  straightforward. 
Result  8.  Demand  underrevelation  makes  up  the  largest  category  of  bidders 
and  grows  over  time.  The  demand  revelation  category  is  small  with  slight 
growth  over  time.  Area  bidding  falls  slightly  over  time  while  DORQ  all  but 
vanishes. 
The  potentially  damaging  strategies  (underreveal,  area  and  DORQ)  do  not 
substantially  affect  the  ranking  of  values  and  therefore  do  not  cause  great 
inefficiency.  Thus,  although  demanders  are  acting  strategically,  the  effect  on 
the  allocation  is  small. 
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Fig.  11.  Quantity  selection  by  demand  type  E/PS. 
the  English  auction  with  priority  service,  we  will  consider  individual  quan- 
titity  deviations  from  the  Walrasian  equilibrium.  Fig.  11 shows  the  difference 
between  the  allocations  demanders  of each  of the  three  types  received  in each 
class and  what  they  would  have  received  at  the  Walrasian  equilibrium. 
Result  9.  We  see a  tendency  for  demanders  of type  1 to  receive  less units  in 
class  2  than  under  the  Walrasian  equilibrium.  In  class  1  we  find  this 
difference  to  be zero  in most  cases.  In  class  2, we see a  tendency  for  type  one 
demanders  to  ‘drop’  units,  that  is ceasing  to  bid  on  a  unit  at  a  lower  price 
than  would  occur  in  a  Walrasian  equilibrium.  Types  2  and  3  receive 
essentially  the  same  allocations  that  they  would  under  the  Walrasian 
equilibrium.  In  class  3, type  1 demanders  receive  more  and  type  3 less  than 
under  price  taking.  This  dropping  of  units  by  type  1 demanders  explains  the 
difference  between  the  observed  and  the  Walrasian  prices.  Type  1 demanders 
also  have  the  greatest  incentive  to  strategically  underbid,  as  they  have  the 
greatest  probability  of affecting  prices. 
3.2.2.  Proportional  rationing 
Uniform  price  auction  We  can  compare  the  number  of  units  allocated 
ex  ante  to  each  demander  with  the  allocations  which  would  occur  in  a 
Walrasian  Equilibrium.  We note  the  following. 
Result  IO.  The  Walrasian  model  in  not  a  good  predictor  of  the  final 
allocations  of this  mechanism. 
Support.  The  difference  between  the  Walrasian  model  and  the  observed 
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Table  12 
Distribution  of  bidding  strategies  E/PR  (%). 
Strategy  All  periods  Last  3  periods 
Overbid  50  53 
Underbid  39  33 
Mixed  11  14 
allocations  are  often  large  and  do  not  seem  to  form  any  systematic  pattern. 
This  result,  coupled  with  the  fact  that  this  was  the  least  efficient  of  the  four 
conditions,  leads  us  to  believe  that  in  this  condition  it  was  difficult  for 
demanders  to  form  consistent  strategies. 
English  auction  The  most  notable  pattern  of  individual  behavior  was  the 
fact  that,  like  in  the  English  auction  with  priority  service,  type  one 
demanders  ‘dropped’  units.  This  caused  other  demanders,  especially  type 
three  demanders,  to  be  allocated  extra  units,  Thus  there  seems  to  be  some 
tendency  toward  underrevelation.  Let  us  distinguish  between  three  mutually 
exclusive  and  exhaustive  bidding  strategies  pursued  by  demanders: 
(1)  Overbidders.  Those  who  drop  units  at  prices  higher  than  they  would  in  a 
Walrasian  equilibrium; 
(2)  Underbidders.  Those  who  drop  units  at  prices  lower  than  they  would  in  a 
Walrasian  equilbirum. 
(3)  Mixed.  Those  who  do  both. 
Table  12  gives  the  percentage  of  the  time  that  each  strategy  was  pursued 
by  each  demander  type  overall  as  well  as  in  the  last  four  periods.  It  appears 
that  demander  behavior  does  not  change  over  time.  No  ‘learning’  is  taking 
place. 
4.  Conclusions 
This  study  considered  two  alternative  institutions  which  have  desirable 
properties  when  demands  are  for  single  units,  the  English  and  the  sealed  bid 
uniform  price  auctions,  with  which  to  implement  priority  service  and 
proportional  rationing.  We  recognize  that  these  experiments  are  exploratory, 
especially  in  light  of  the  paucity  of  previous  literature  on  the  topic  of 
auctions  when  demands  are  multi-unit. 
Our  results  suggest  that  although  proportional  rationing  does  seem  to  do 
well  when  large  curtailments  arise,  priority  service  generates  more  efficient 
allocations  than  proportional  rationing  in  our  environment.  Here  we  are  in 
agreement  with  the  results  of  Elliot  et  al  (1990)  even  though  their  ‘pricing C.  Noussair  and  D. Porter,  Allocating  priority  with auctions  191 
mechanism’  is  vastly  different.  It  is  an  open  question,  however,  whether  there 
exists  a  better  implementation  of  proportional  rationing  than  those  we  chose. 
Contrary  to  previous  experimental  results,  the  sealed  bid  implementation 
of  priority  service  performed  better  than  the  English.  However,  since  the  two 
mechanisms  are  no  longer  strategically  equivalent  in  the  multi-unit  demand 
environment  and  their  relative  efficiencies  are  parameter  dependent,  we  do 
not  necessarily  expect  this  result  for  all  sets  of  parameters.  It  also  may  be  the 
case  that  it  is  easier  to  act  strategically  in  the  English  auction  since  bidders 
can  directly  see  how  their  strategies  affect  contract  prices. 
The  level  of  efficiency  was  higher  in  the  absence  of  common  information. 
Without  the  common  information  on  which  to  condition  demands,  it  may 
have  been  more  difficult  to  behave  strategically.  Strategic  behavior  is  evident 
in  the  large  deviations  of  observed  prices  to  those  that  would  have  prevailed 
had  all  demanders  been  price  takers  when  there  was  common  information. 
Therefore,  for  the  environment  and  auctions  used  in  our  study,  the  competi- 
tive  model  is  not  a  good  predictor. 
Further  research  could  test  the  robustness  of  our  results.  There  are  many 
types  of  induced  demand  conditions  under  which  to  examine  the  mechan- 
isms,  informational  environments  and  rationing  rules  defined  above.  For 
example,  demands  could  have  nonconvexities  as  would  arise  with  minimum 
startup  costs  and  indivisibilities.  Such  indivisibilities  may  lead  a  proportional 
rationing  scheme  to  large  inefficiencies  because  when  allocations  are  scaled 
back,  resources  may  go  unused.  In  our  study,  we  tried  to  make  an 
enviornment  favorable  to  each  rationing  system  in  the  sense  of  not  trying 
deliberately  to  cause  low  efficiencies  with  either  rationing  rule. 
An  environment  with  a  larger  number  of  demanders,  in  addition  to 
providing  a  way  to  test  robustness,  may  generate  prices  and  allocations 
closer  to  the  Walrasian  equilibrium.  It  may  also  diminish  the  incentive  to  act 
in  strategic  manner,  thus  exposing  some  other  potential  sources  of 
inefficiency. 
Another  direction  for  future  research  would  be  to  consider  other  institu- 
tions  within  which  to  compare  the  two  rationing  rules.  For  instance,  the 
poor  performance  of  the  English  auction  under  priority  service  may  be 
corrigible  with  the  following  modification:  Change  the  mechanism  to  an 
English  clock  where  all  demanders  know  how  many  units  are  asked  for  by 
buyers  as  the  price  increases.  The  clock  stops  when  a  total  of  one  unit  is 
demanded.  Priority  is  then  given  in  descending  order  of  drop-out  points. 
This  mechanism  incorporates  the  feature  of  a  uniform  price  while  eliciting 
the  entire  order  of  demand. 192  C.  Noussair  and  D.  Porter,  Allocating  priority  with  auctions 
Appendix  A. Demand  and  cost  draws,  and  supply  draws 
Table  A. 1 
Demand  and  cost  draws.” 
Subject 
Period  1  2  3  4  5  6 
1  LHHLMH 
2  LLMLLM 
3  M  L  M  M  M  H 
4  MMHHML 
5  H  M  H  M  H  H 
6  LLMHLL 
7  H  M  L  M  L  H 
S  L  L  H  H  H  L 
9  LHMMLH 
10  LMMHLL 
‘H =Type  1 demand,  k  =Type  2  demand,  L= 
Type  3 demand 
Supply  draws. 
Period  Quantity  cost 
1  5  0 
2  5  0 
3  10  400 
4  10  0 
5  10  200 
6  5  200 
7  15  0 
8  10  200 
9  10  200 
10  10  0 
0.00 
-5  0  5  10  15  20 
Capacity 
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Appendix B. Efficiency and revenue calculations 
1.  Uniform  price  with  priority  service 
The  calculation  of  efficiency  proceeds  as follows.  First,  we  form  the  entire 
array  of  bids  in  a  similar  fashion  as  the  array  of  valuations  in  fig.  1. These 
are  the  bids  on  every  unit  ranked  from  highest  to  lowest. 
Here  we  define  bidding  competitively  as  bidding  without  attempting  to 
affect  the  price.  Notice  that  this  is the  same  as truthful  revelation  of demand. 
Therefore,  if demanders  are  behaving  like  price-takers,  the  bid  array  equals 
the  actual  array  of valuations. 
There  is  a  maximum  amount  of  surplus  realizable  in  each  of  the  nine 
states.  Notice  that  this  area  is bounded  by  the  demand  array,  the  supply,  and 
cost  curve  as  in  fig.  4.  The  efficiency  of  the  mechanism  in  a  state  is  the 
fraction  of this  maximum  surplus  which  is actually  realized.  Notice  that  if all 
bidders  are  behaving  competitively  in  the  uniform  price  auction,  the 
efficiency  is  100%. When  all  bidders  are  behaving  competitively,  we term  the 
resulting  equilibrium  the  Walrasian. 
Suppose  we  define  the  maximum  realizable  surplus  when  the  supply 
capacity  is  5 and  the  cost  is 0  as  0:  (when  the  supply  is  10 and  the  cost  is 
400  the  surplus  is  vtO,*, etc.).  Let  us  define  the  actual  surplus  which  would 
result  from  the  bids  made  if the  supply  were  5 and  the  cost  0 as vbidz.  Then 
the  formula  for  the  ex ante  efficiency  of the  allocation  is given  by 
(vbidg + vbid:OO  +  . *. + vbid:iO)/(uz  + II:“” +  . . .  +  II::“). 
The  ex  ante  revenue  is  calcuIated  in  the  foIlowing  manner.  Consider  the 
prices  and  quantity  sold  in  each  supply  state  given  the  array  of  bids.  Recall 
that  the  price  in  this  mechanism  is determined  by  the  higher  of  the  highest 
rejected  bid  and  the  cost  draw.  Define  the  prices  for  each  supply  state  as 
0  pS,. . .,&”  as  we  did  with  efficiencies.  Then  the  ex  ante  revenue  can  be 
calculated  as follows. 
2.  anguish  priorate  service 
The  efficiencies,  prices,  and  revenues  are  calculated  as  follows.  Array  the 
bids  as  in  section  1 and  determine  the  area  of  surplus.  The  efficiency  is then 
calculated  as  in  the  uniform  price  auction.  Under  price-taking,  the  efficiency 194  C.  Noussair  and  D.  Porter,  Allocating  priority  with auctions 
Table  B.l 
Prices  at  which  a  demander  would  lower  her  demand. 
Demander  type 
Unit  Type  1  Type 2  Type 3 
1  900  850  800 
2  761  750  533 
3  561  350  261 
4  483  275  0 
5  350  150  0 
will  not  always  be  loo’%.  The  prices  of  the  competitive  equilibrium  are 
calculated  by  finding  a  set  of  prices  which  causes  the  demanders  with  the  live 
highest  values  to  be  unwilling  to  change  their  bids  if they  are  in  priority  class 
one.  The  same  must  apply  to  the  sixth  through  tenth  highest  bidders  in 
priority  class  two  and  the  11 th  through  15th  highest  in  class  three.  The  price 
in  class  three  must  be  high  enough  so  that  the  16th  highest  bidder  would  not 
attempt  to  enter  class  three.  We  choose  the  lowest  set  of  prices  for  which 
these  conditions  are  met.  Notice  that  the  price  in  classes  two  and  three  are 
sometimes  below  the  cost  draw  of  400.  If  this  is  the  case  and  costs  are 
actually  400  in  the  realized  supply  state  then  there  may  be  units  whose 
valuations  are  greater  than  400  are  not  allocated.  We  therefore  make  the 
following  correction.  For  every  price  less  than  400,  we  ask  if  the  demander 
would  be  better  off,  ex  ante,  if  he  were  to  bid  400.  If  he  is  better  off,  we  then 
raise  his  bid  from  the  ‘Walrasian’  to  400.  It  is  not  always  the  case,  however, 
that  the  demander  is  better  off,  and  this  accounts  for  the  inefficiency  of  this 
auction.  Revenue  is  calculated  by  the  same  formula  as  in  the  uniform  price 
auction.  The  obvious  differences  are  in  the  way  the  prices  are  set  (they  are 
equal  to  the  actual  amount  bid)  and  the  correction  discussed  above. 
3.  English  and  uniform  price  auctions  with  proportional  rationing 
Ex  ante  efficiency  is  determined  as  before,  as  the  weighted  fraction  of 
maximum  possible  surplus  allocated  ex  ante  with  the  bids  made.  The 
efficiency  calculation  for  price-taking  demanders  makes  use  of  what  we  call 
the  competitive  proportional  rationing  bidding  function.  This  is  defined  as  a 
mapping  from  price  to  the  set  of  positive  integers  which  indicates  the  number 
of  slots  a  demander  wants  to  win  at  that  price.  Table  A.1  lists  the  prices  at 
which  a  demander  of  each  type  would  lower  her  demand  from  the  number  of 
units  specified  in  the  column  labeled  unit  to  one  unit  less  if  she  were 
behaving  competitively.  Recall  that  behaving  competitively  means  bidding  as 
if one  could  not  affect  the  price  (no  strategic  underbidding). 
Notice  that  efliciency  here  will  not  be  100%  for  our  parameters  because  the 
allocation  cannot  be  efficient  for  supplies  of  5,  10  and  15  units  simul- C.  Noussair  and  D.  Porter,  Allocating  priority  with auctions  195 
taneously.  The  bidding  function  is  the  same  for  both  the  English  and  the 
uniform  price  auctions  with  proportional  rationing.  Since  the  price  is  uniform 
and  independent  of  the  supply  state,  the  price  and  revenue  calculations  are 
very  simple.  The  price  is  that  which  clears  the  market  if  all  demanders  are 
behaving  as  price  takers.  The  revenue  is  this  price  multiplied  by  the  quantity 
supplied  in  each  state  weighted  by  the  probability  of  the  state. 
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